Arbeitspapier
Search, Bargaining, and Employer Discrimination
This paper analyses Becker´s (1971) theory of employer discrimination within a search and wage-bargaining setting. Discriminatory firms pay workers who are discriminated against less, and apply stricter hiring-criteria to these workers. It is shown that the highest profits are realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Moreover, once ownership and control are separated, both highest profits and highest utility may be realized by firms with a positive discrimination coefficient. Thus, market forces, like entry and/or takeovers do not ensure that wage differentials due to employer discrimination will disappear.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998:13
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Discrimination
- Thema
-
Search
discrimination
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rosén, Åsa
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2420
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rosén, Åsa
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2001
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