Arbeitspapier
Adverse selection, learning, and competitive search
I develop a dynamic version of the competitive search model with adverse selection in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010). My model allows for an analysis of the effects of firm learning on labor market efficiency in the presence of search frictions. I find that firm learning increases relative expected earnings in high-ability jobs and, thereby, enhances imitation incentives of low-ability workers. The net effect on the aggregate expected match surplus and unemployment is indeterminate a priori. Numerical results show that firm learning does not increase labor market efficiency.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 700
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Thema
-
job search
on-the-job effort
asymmetric information
learning
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mayr-Dorn, Karin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
- (wo)
-
Essen
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mayr-Dorn, Karin
- Global Labor Organization (GLO)
Entstanden
- 2020
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