Arbeitspapier
Time, Risk, Precommitment, and Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance Markets
This informal paper explores models of competitive insurance market equilibrium when individuals of initially similar apparent risk experience divergence in risk levels over time. The information structure is modeled in three alternative ways: all insurers and insureds know risk at any point in time, current insurer and insured know risk, and only the individual knows risk. Insurers always know the average risk. It is shown that some models lead to backloading of premiums in which initial premiums are less than initial period expected expense, and that other models lead to frontloading of premiums and policy provisions of guaranteed renewability. Finally, it is shown that guaranteed renewability greatly reduces the possibility of adverse selection.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1068
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pauly, Mark V.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pauly, Mark V.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2003
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Competitive search markets with adverse selection
The adverse selection problem in imperfectly competitive credit markets
Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection
A game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
Hidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selection
Hidden regret in insurance markets: adverse and advantageous selection
Efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection
Adverse selection, learning, and competitive search
Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Optimal insurance with adverse selection
Competitive search markets with adverse selection
The adverse selection problem in imperfectly competitive credit markets
Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection
A game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
Hidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selection
Hidden regret in insurance markets: adverse and advantageous selection
Efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection
Adverse selection, learning, and competitive search
Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection
Optimal insurance with adverse selection
Competitive search markets with adverse selection
The adverse selection problem in imperfectly competitive credit markets
Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection
A game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
Hidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selection
Hidden regret in insurance markets: adverse and advantageous selection
Efficient competitive equilibria with adverse selection
Adverse selection, learning, and competitive search
Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection
Dynamic Insurance and Adverse Selection