Arbeitspapier

The adverse selection problem in imperfectly competitive credit markets

We study the adverse selection problem in imperfectly competitive credit markets and illustrate the circumstances where a separating equilibrium emerges, even without collateral.The borrowers are heterogeneous in their preferences concerning the banks.Separation obtains in market segments where the 'high risk' borrowers receive credit from their preferred bank.The 'low risk' borrowers choose the ex-ante less-preferred bank that offers loan contracts with lower interest rates.The availability of credit will be maximized under an intermediate level of competition, a prediction that is supported by recent empirical evidence.

ISBN
952-462-329-3
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 26/2006

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
asymmetric information
credit rationing
bank differentiation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mälkönen, Ville
Vesala, Timo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mälkönen, Ville
  • Vesala, Timo
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2006

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