Arrow's paradox and markets for nonproprietary information

Arbeitspapier

Arrow's information paradox asserts that demand for undisclosed information is undefined. Reassessing the paradox, I argue that the value of information for the buyer depends on its relevance, which can be known ex ante, and the uncertainty shifts to the capability of the seller to acquire the knowledge and her reliability in disclosing it. These three together form the buyer's reservation price. Consequently, differences in capability and reliability between the sellers may revoke the appropriation problem of nonproprietary information, where the original source loses her monopoly after the first purchase.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2013/2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
• Subject: Arrow's information paradox ; markets for information ; knowledge ; reliability ; appropriability

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Leppälä, Samuli
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
• (where): Cardiff
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101125
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET