Interpreting Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

Arbeitspapier

Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is commonly understood to invoke a dictatorship that is somehow lurking within our voting arrangements. The theorem has been described as proving that “any constitution that respects transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and unanimity is a dictatorship”. But the theorem is really not about dictatorship. It is more appropriately understood as being about the spoiler problem, about the possibility that the presence of a candidate who cannot win the election himself may, nevertheless, violate the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” by switching the outcome of the election between two other candidates. The theorem becomes that no electoral system is guaranteed to avoid the spoiler problem altogether, regardless of the options and regardless of voter preferences.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1384

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Welfare Economics: General ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Impossibility Theorem ; Spoilers ; Dictatorship

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Usher, Dan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kingston (Ontario)
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/188896
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET