Arbeitspapier

Arrow's impossibility theorem: Preference diversity in a single-profile world

In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2007-12

Classification
Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
Arrow’s theorem
single-profile
preference diversity
Unmöglichkeitstheorem
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Feldman, Allan M.
Serrano, Roberto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Brown University, Department of Economics
(where)
Providence, RI
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Feldman, Allan M.
  • Serrano, Roberto
  • Brown University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2007

Other Objects (12)