Arbeitspapier
Arrow's impossibility theorem: Preference diversity in a single-profile world
In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2007-12
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Welfare Economics: General
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Arrow’s theorem
single-profile
preference diversity
Unmöglichkeitstheorem
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Feldman, Allan M.
Serrano, Roberto
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Brown University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Providence, RI
- (when)
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2007
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Feldman, Allan M.
- Serrano, Roberto
- Brown University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2007