Artikel
Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals
The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual set of axioms, the classical impossibilities persist in countable societies. Along the way, a new proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in the style of Peter Fishburn's well known proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem is obtained.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 333-350 ; Heidelberg: Springer
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
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Arrow's impossibility theorem
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Infinite society
Continuity
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Springer
- (where)
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Heidelberg
- (when)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.1007/s13209-018-0182-4
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar
- Springer
Time of origin
- 2018
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