Arbeitspapier
No-Envy Arrow's Conditions
This paper studies the relationship between the theory of distributive justice based on the concept of envy-freeness and Arrovian social choise theory. We define two conditions of No-envy and study their relationship with Arrow' scondition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a weakening of this condition called Personal States Independence and the condition of Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the power to veto (in a limited sense) at least one alternative (presumably, one alternative which is particularly unfair to him).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 243
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Denicolò, Vincenzo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1996
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5066
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Denicolò, Vincenzo
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1996