Arbeitspapier
Connecting and Resolving Sen's and Arrow's Theorems
As shown, the source of Sen's and Arrow's impossibility theorems is that Sen's Liberal condition and Arrow's IIA counter the critical assumption that voters' have transitive preferences. As this allows transitive and certain cyclic preferences to become indistinguishable, the Pareto condition forces cycles. Once the common cause of these perplexing conclusions is understood, resolutions are immediate.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1132
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Saari, Donald G.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1995
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Saari, Donald G.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1995
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Calculus and Extensions of Arrow's Theorem
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Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions
Arrow's impossibility theorem: Two simple single-profile versions
Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and CorrespondenceTheorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions
Geo-arrow and geo-parquet
Bow and arrow in bamboo ...
7. SPEAR AND ARROW HEADS
Arrow's impossibility theorem: Preference diversity in a single-profile world
Theorems connecting the sums of homogeneous products with division and the roots of equations.