Artikel

Effective European Antitrust : Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Economic Inquiry ; ISSN: 1465-7295 ; Volume: 54 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1884-1903 ; Hoboken: Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Clougherty, Joseph A.
Duso, Tomaso
Lee, Miyu
Seldeslachts, Jo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
(where)
Hoboken
(when)
2016

DOI
doi:10.1111/ecin.12346
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Clougherty, Joseph A.
  • Duso, Tomaso
  • Lee, Miyu
  • Seldeslachts, Jo
  • Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
  • ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics

Time of origin

  • 2016

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