Artikel
Effective European Antitrust : Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Economic Inquiry ; ISSN: 1465-7295 ; Volume: 54 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1884-1903 ; Hoboken: Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Clougherty, Joseph A.
Duso, Tomaso
Lee, Miyu
Seldeslachts, Jo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (where)
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Hoboken
- (when)
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2016
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/ecin.12346
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Clougherty, Joseph A.
- Duso, Tomaso
- Lee, Miyu
- Seldeslachts, Jo
- Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Time of origin
- 2016