Arbeitspapier
Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies
In this paper we investigate how the competitiveness of Cournot markets varies with the number of firms in an industry. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. With two firms we find some collusion. Three-firm oligopolies tend to produce outputs at the Nash level. Markets with four or five firms are never collusive and typically settle at or above the Cournot outcome. Some of those markets are actually quite competitive with outputs close to the Walrasian outcome.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 12/2001
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
Cournot markets
oligopolies
experiments
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Huck, Steffen
Normann, Hans-Theo
Oechssler, Jörg
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Huck, Steffen
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Oechssler, Jörg
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Time of origin
- 2001
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