Heterogeneous Penalties and Private Information

Arbeitspapier

The theoretical framework of the adequacy or otherwise of fine reductions under the EU and US Leniency Programmes has been explored widely. However, the characteristics of the reporting cartel members remain unexplained. This is the first paper to develop a model where heterogeneous cartel members have private information on the probability of conviction. It is shown that firms which receive higher fines are more likely to report the cartel. To validate this result and analyze the sources of fine heterogeneity, data for EU and US cartels are used. Being the first reporter is shown to be correlated with recidivism, leadership and other fine reductions. Some characteristics of the cartels where reporting occurred are also unveiled. Identifying the characteristics of the reporting firms is vital to dissolve and dissuade cartels and the wider policy implications of these findings are discussed in the paper.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SITE Working Paper ; No. 29

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Economics of Regulation
• Thema: Cartels ; competition policy ; Leniency Programme ; private information ; self-reporting

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Marvão, Catarina
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/204740
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ