Fighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniency

Arbeitspapier

Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism: double-dealing, whistle-blowing and extortion are significant uncertainties for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators may use an asymmetric design of (criminal) sanctions and leniency programs to amplify these inherent risks, thereby destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric penalties and (ex-ante) leniency do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and may be a useful tool to disband the 'pact of silence' characteristic of corrupt arrangements. In particular, we show that bribe-takers should less be penalized for taking and more for reciprocating a bribe. Likewise, bribe-givers should be punished for giving bribes, but not for accepting the bribetakers' reciprocity.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 59

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
• Thema: corruption ; asymmetric penalties ; leniency ; (self-) reporting ; whistle-blowing ; Korruption ; Kriminalpolitik ; Kriminalitätsökonomik ; Opportunismus ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lambsdorff, Johann ; Nell, Mathias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
• (wo): Göttingen
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32012
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ