Arbeitspapier
Caps on political contributions, monetary penalties and politician preferences
With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In contrast to Kaplan and Wettstein (AER, 2006) and Gale and Che (AER, 2006), a cap is never neutral on the expected cost of contributions nor on the policy outcome. Furthermore more restrictive caps can lead to increased aggregate contributions. When the penalty for exceeding the cap is small enough that it is impossible to suppress all contributions, the influence of money on policy is minimized with a binding but non-zero cap and maximized with no cap.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP09/12
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
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All-pay auction
Campaign finance reform
Soft money
Explicit ceiling
BCRA
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
- (wo)
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Dublin
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pastine, Ivan
- Pastine, Tuvana
- University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
Entstanden
- 2009