Arbeitspapier

Caps on political contributions, monetary penalties and politician preferences

With politician preferences over policy outcomes, the effect of a contribution cap with monetary penalties for exceeding the cap is starkly different from the case with an indifferent politician. In contrast to Kaplan and Wettstein (AER, 2006) and Gale and Che (AER, 2006), a cap is never neutral on the expected cost of contributions nor on the policy outcome. Furthermore more restrictive caps can lead to increased aggregate contributions. When the penalty for exceeding the cap is small enough that it is impossible to suppress all contributions, the influence of money on policy is minimized with a binding but non-zero cap and maximized with no cap.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series ; No. WP09/12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Noncooperative Games
Thema
All-pay auction
Campaign finance reform
Soft money
Explicit ceiling
BCRA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pastine, Ivan
Pastine, Tuvana
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics
(wo)
Dublin
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pastine, Ivan
  • Pastine, Tuvana
  • University College Dublin, UCD School of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2009

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