Arbeitspapier

Pitfalls in vertical arrangements

A popular way of obtaining essential inputs requires the establishment of an input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section of the vertical chain of production by firms competing and selling final goods in the downstream (D) section of the vertical chain. In spite of the apparently simple arrangement there are many possible governances for the management of the IPJV according to the ownership structure and to the degree of delegation granted to the IPJV by parent firms. We explore the best sustainable governance arrangement for the IPJV. We address this question in a duopoly framwork and we find a large area of impossible vertical arrangements associated with technological asymmtery. The most likely governance of the vertical arrangment associated to the IPJV is total independence.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 709

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Vergari, Cecilia
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2010

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4533
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rossini, Gianpaolo
  • Vergari, Cecilia
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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