- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
In: 10.1002/net.22218
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Aachen
- (wer)
-
Universitätsbibliothek der RWTH Aachen
- (wann)
-
2024
- Urheber
- DOI
-
10.18154/RWTH-2024-04591
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2405010139321.953052968017
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 14.08.2025, 10:47 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Beteiligte
- Eickhoff, Katharina
- McCormick, S. Thomas
- Peis, Britta
- Rieken, Niklas
- Vargas Koch, Laura
- Universitätsbibliothek der RWTH Aachen
Entstanden
- 2024
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