Arbeitspapier
Lower sanctions, greater antitrust compliance? Cartel conduct with imperfect information about enforcement risk
This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents about law enforcement, may prevent hardcore cartels. Compliance training programs may also promote forms of cooperation that are beneficial for customers. The article shows that a competition authority can sometimes spur the implementation of compliance programs by imposing lower sanctions on wrongdoers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 60-2014
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Paha, Johannes
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (wo)
-
Marburg
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Paha, Johannes
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Entstanden
- 2014
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