Lower sanctions, greater antitrust compliance? Cartel conduct with imperfect information about enforcement risk

Arbeitspapier

This article provides a model of two risk-neutral firms that may cooperate to achieve a goal that is potentially illegal. The model assumes enforcement risk and firms that are imperfectly informed about antitrust law enforcement. It is shown that compliance training, which educates the agents about law enforcement, may prevent hardcore cartels. Compliance training programs may also promote forms of cooperation that are beneficial for customers. The article shows that a competition authority can sometimes spur the implementation of compliance programs by imposing lower sanctions on wrongdoers.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 60-2014

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Paha, Johannes
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
• (where): Marburg
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/106476