Arbeitspapier
Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance
Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 04-04
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Agarwal, Vikas
Daniel, Naveen D.
Naik, Narayan Y.
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
- (wo)
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Cologne
- (wann)
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2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Agarwal, Vikas
- Daniel, Naveen D.
- Naik, Narayan Y.
- University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
Entstanden
- 2009