Arbeitspapier

Role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 04-04

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Agarwal, Vikas
Daniel, Naveen D.
Naik, Narayan Y.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(wo)
Cologne
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Agarwal, Vikas
  • Daniel, Naveen D.
  • Naik, Narayan Y.
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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