Arbeitspapier

Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power

We re-consider the bilateral bargaining problem of a multi-product, manufacturer-retailer trading relationship. O'Brien and Shaffer (Rand JE 35:573-598, 2005) have shown that the unbundling of contracts leads to downward distorted production levels if seller power is strong, while otherwise the joint profit maximizing quantities are contracted (which is also always the case when bundling contracts are feasible). We show that the unbundling of contracts also leads to downward distorted output levels when the buyer firm has sufficient (Nash) bargaining power (i.e., buyer power). Our result is driven by cost substitutability (diseconomies of scope).

ISBN
978-3-86304-328-5
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 329

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Antitrust Law
Thema
Vertical Restraints
Bundling
Buyer Power

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
Wey, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
  • Wey, Christian
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2019

Ähnliche Objekte (12)