Arbeitspapier

Competition for viewers and advertisers in a TV oligopoly

We consider a model of a TV oligopoly where TV channels transmit advertising and viewers dislike such commercials. We show that advertisers make a lower profit the larger the number of TV channels. If TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes, there will be underprovision of advertising relative to social optimum. We also find that the more viewers dislike ads, the more likely it is that welfare is increasing in the number of advertising financed TV channels. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a larger amount of advertising than private TV channels. It may even have advertising in cases where advertising is wasteful per se.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1862

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Entertainment; Media
Advertising
Thema
Fernsehen
Oligopol
Fernsehwerbung
Medienverhalten
Substitutionseffekt
Wohlfahrtstheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kind, Hans Jarle
Nilssen, Tore
Sørgard, Lars
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kind, Hans Jarle
  • Nilssen, Tore
  • Sørgard, Lars
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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