On competition and the strategic management of intellectual property in oligopoly

Arbeitspapier

An innovative firm chooses strategically whether to patent its process innovation or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rival's beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. Different measures of competitive pressure in the product market have different effects on the equilibrium patenting choices of an innovative firm with unknown costs and probabilistic patent validity. Increasing the number of firms (degree of product substitutability) gives a smaller (greater) patenting incentive. Switching from Bertrand to Cournot competition gives a smaller (greater) patenting incentive if patent protection is weak (strong).

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2009,13

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
• Thema: Bertrand and Cournot competition ; oligopoly ; product differentiation ; entry ; asymmetric information ; strategic disclosure ; stochastic patent ; trade secret ; process innovation ; imitation ; Innovation ; Patent ; Oligopol ; Imitationswettbewerb ; Produktdifferenzierung ; Informationsverhalten ; Spieltheorie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Jansen, Jos
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32252
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ