Arbeitspapier

Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism

In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signalling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 712

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
reciprocity
maladaptation
evolutionary foundations
human altruism
Altruismus
Bioökonomik
Verhaltensökonomik
Spieltheorie
Gerechtigkeit
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fehr, Ernst
Henrich, Joseph
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:47 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Henrich, Joseph
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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