Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism

Arbeitspapier

In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically unrelated strangers. We provide ethnographic and experimental evidence suggesting that ultimate theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, costly signalling and indirect reciprocity do not provide satisfactory evolutionary explanations of strong reciprocity. The problem of these theories is that they can rationalize strong reciprocity only if it is viewed as maladaptive behavior whereas the evidence suggests that it is an adaptive trait. Thus, we conclude that alternative evolutionary approaches are needed to provide ultimate accounts of strong reciprocity.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 712

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Relation of Economics to Social Values ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: reciprocity ; maladaptation ; evolutionary foundations ; human altruism ; Altruismus ; Bioökonomik ; Verhaltensökonomik ; Spieltheorie ; Gerechtigkeit ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fehr, Ernst ; Henrich, Joseph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20588
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:47 AM CET