Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Arbeitspapier

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1963

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General
• Thema: Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Markteintritt ; Industrielle Forschung ; Interessenpolitik ; Oligopol ; Neue Wachstumstheorie ; Wissenstransfer ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Grossmann, Volker ; Steger, Thomas M.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26008
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ