Do cost-sharing and entry deregulation curb pharmaceutical Innovation?

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the role of both cost-sharing schemes in health insurance systems and entry regulation for pharmaceutical R&D expenditure, drug prices, aggregate productivity, and income. The analysis suggests that both an increase in the coinsurance rate and stricter price regulations adversely affect R&D spending in the pharmaceutical sector. In contrast, entry deregulation may lead to quality-improvements of pharmaceuticals, despite reducing price-setting power of pharmaceutical companies. Extension to an endogenous growth context suggests that, when individual labor supply depends on health status, both cost-sharing and entry barriers in the pharmaceutical sector also affect aggregate productivity and wage rates.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3439

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Health: General ; Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General ; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
• Subject: aggregate productivity ; cost-sharing ; entry deregulation ; health insurance ; pharmaceutical innovation ; Pharmazeutische Forschung ; Forschungsfinanzierung ; Kostenbeteiligung ; Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung ; Markteintritt ; Gesundheitsökonomik ; Produktivität ; Neue Wachstumstheorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grossmann, Volker
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46570
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET