Konferenzbeitrag
Bank Bonuses and Bail-out Guarantees
This paper analyzes how a bank shareholder optimally designs the compensation scheme of a bank manager if there are agency problems between the shareholder and the manager, and how this design changes in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a problem of excessive risk-taking, bail-out guarantees lead to steeper compensation schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bail-out perceptions will make it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose ceilings on bank bonuses.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Causes and Consequences of Bank Bail-Outs ; No. D7-V2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Bonus payments
bail-out guarantees
bank manager compensation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hakenes, Hendrik
Schnabel, Isabel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Verein für Socialpolitik
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Hakenes, Hendrik
- Schnabel, Isabel
- Verein für Socialpolitik
Entstanden
- 2010
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