Bank Bail-outs, International Linkages and Cooperation

Konferenzbeitrag

Financial institutions are increasingly linked internationally and engaged in cross-border operations. As a result, financial crises and potential bail-outs by governments have important international implications. Extending Allen and Gale (2000), we provide a model of international contagion allowing for bank bail-outs financed by distortionary taxes. In the sequential game between governments, there are inefficiencies due to spillovers, free-riding and limited burden-sharing. When countries are of equal size, an increase in cross-border deposit holdings improves, in general, the non-cooperative outcome. For efficient crisis managment, ex-ante fiscal burden sharing is essential as ex-post contracts between governments do not achieve the same global welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Causes and Consequences of Bank Bail-Outs ; No. D7-V3

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Financial Aspects of Economic Integration ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission
• Thema: bail-out ; contagion ; financial crisis ; international institutional arrangements

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Niepmann, Friederike ; Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Verein für Socialpolitik
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37518
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ