Arbeitspapier

Trading for bailouts

Government interventions such as bailouts are often implemented in times of high uncertainty. Policymakers may therefore rely on information from financial markets to guide their decisions. We propose a model in which a policymaker learns from market activity and where market participants have high stakes in the intervention. We study how the strategic behavior of informed traders affects market informativeness, the probability and efficiency of bailouts, and stock prices. We apply the model to study the liquidity support of distressed banks and derive implications for market informativeness and policy design. Commitment to a minimum liquidity support can increase market informativeness and welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2020-23

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Financial institutions
Financial markets
Financial system regulation and policies
Lenderof last resort

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ahnert, Toni
Machado, Caio
Pereira, Ana Elisa Gonçalves
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2020

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2020-23
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ahnert, Toni
  • Machado, Caio
  • Pereira, Ana Elisa Gonçalves
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2020

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