Arbeitspapier
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 749
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Environmental Economics: General
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
-
Bologna
- (when)
-
2011
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4491
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lambertini, Luca
- Tampieri, Alessandro
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2011