Arbeitspapier

Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution

We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement. We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting minimum quality standard is indeed binding.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 749

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Environmental Economics: General

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4491
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Tampieri, Alessandro
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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