Arbeitspapier
Consumer-Optimal Information Design
In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain partially uninformed, since such an information structure induces the seller to set low prices. For the optimal information signal, trade is efficient, and the seller only extracts the static monopoly profit. Further, I fully characterize all possible surplus divisions that can arise in sequential screening for a given prior.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 53
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
-
information disclosure
sequential screening
strategic learning
bayesian persuasion
mechanism design
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
von Wangenheim, Jonas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (where)
-
München und Berlin
- (when)
-
2017
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- von Wangenheim, Jonas
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Time of origin
- 2017
Other Objects (12)
Consumer Information
Consumer bankruptcy and information
Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants under Asymmetric Information
Optimal recall period length in consumer payment surveys
Optimal multiproduct nonlinear pricing with correlated consumer types
Optimal Auction Design
Optimal discrimination designs
Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness
Brand positioning and consumer taste information
Optimal designs for smoothing splines
Disagreement and Optimal Security Design
Consumer Information
Consumer bankruptcy and information
Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants under Asymmetric Information
Optimal recall period length in consumer payment surveys
Optimal multiproduct nonlinear pricing with correlated consumer types
Optimal Auction Design
Optimal discrimination designs
Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness
Brand positioning and consumer taste information
Optimal designs for smoothing splines
Disagreement and Optimal Security Design
Consumer Information
Consumer bankruptcy and information
Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants under Asymmetric Information
Optimal recall period length in consumer payment surveys
Optimal multiproduct nonlinear pricing with correlated consumer types
Optimal Auction Design
Optimal discrimination designs
Information Disclosure and Consumer Awareness
Brand positioning and consumer taste information
Optimal designs for smoothing splines