Are Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments Discriminatory?

Arbeitspapier

I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players’ ex-ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs will be small (large). The differing results originate from the higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction. Moreover, the resulting discouragement effect in tournaments with all-pay auctions implies lower aggregate effort than in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests. The fairness of round-robin tournaments may be improved by the use of an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex-ante.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6421

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Sports Economics: General
• Subject: sequential round-robin tournament ; contest success function ; discriminatory power ; Tullock contest ; all-pay auction

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sahm, Marco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/161860
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET