Arbeitspapier

The impact of council voting rules on EU decision-making

This paper deals with the design of voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are examined. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is that voting rules matter. This clearly explains why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations. The internal decisionmaking rules in the Council have substantial impact on both the national distribution of power in the Council and inter-institutional power between the EU's decision-making bodies.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ETLA Discussion Papers ; No. 1162

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
European integration
Council of Ministers
power
Europäische Integration
Politische Entscheidung
Abstimmungsregel
Politisches System
Spieltheorie
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Widgrén, Mika
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Widgrén, Mika
  • The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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