Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

Internal decision-making rules and collusion

We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.

Internal decision-making rules and collusion

Urheber*in: Rasch, Alexander; Wambach, Achim

Free access - no reuse

Extent
Seite(n): 703–715
Language
Englisch
Notes
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Bibliographic citation
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(2)

Classification
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Subject
Wirtschaft
Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Delegation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Rasch, Alexander
Wambach, Achim
Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Niederlande
(when)
2009

DOI
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-313424
Rights
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Last update
21.06.2024, 4:26 PM CEST

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Object type

  • Zeitschriftenartikel

Associated

  • Rasch, Alexander
  • Wambach, Achim

Time of origin

  • 2009

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