Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Internal decision-making rules and collusion
We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company. The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.
- Extent
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Seite(n): 703–715
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(2)
- Classification
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Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Subject
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Wirtschaft
Betriebswirtschaftslehre
Delegation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Rasch, Alexander
Wambach, Achim
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (where)
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Niederlande
- (when)
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2009
- DOI
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-313424
- Rights
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GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Last update
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21.06.2024, 4:26 PM CEST
Data provider
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Associated
- Rasch, Alexander
- Wambach, Achim
Time of origin
- 2009