- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Ausgabe
-
Version November 2011
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
CFS working paper series ; 2011,31
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt am Main
- (wer)
-
Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- (wann)
-
2011
- Urheber
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-241157
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
14.08.2025, 11:00 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Doherty, Neil A.
- Laux, Christian
- Muermann, Alexander
- Univ.-Bibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Entstanden
- 2011
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