Artikel
Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and for implementability of the targeted allocation rule (weak detectability) in this one-shot problem. We decompose the general dynamic problem into one-shot problems, and obtain sufficient conditions for surplus extraction and implementation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 39-69 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Market Design
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
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Dynamic mechanism design
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
revenue maximization
full surplus extraction
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Noda, Shunya
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE2226
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Noda, Shunya
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2019