Artikel

Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments

We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and for implementability of the targeted allocation rule (weak detectability) in this one-shot problem. We decompose the general dynamic problem into one-shot problems, and obtain sufficient conditions for surplus extraction and implementation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 39-69 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Market Design
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
Dynamic mechanism design
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
revenue maximization
full surplus extraction

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Noda, Shunya
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2226
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Noda, Shunya
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2019

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