Arbeitspapier

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation for Reduction of Envy

This paper examines the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem based on Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson's (1990) λ-equitability in a two-class economy. An allocation is λ-equitable if no agent envies a proportion λ of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations for various λ-equitability requirements. When there is one output, the marginal income tax rate can increase only if (but not if) leisure is a luxury. In a multi-commodity model with commodity taxes, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and/or of high Hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 991

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Thema
Income Taxation
Envy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nishimura, Yukihiro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nishimura, Yukihiro
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2000

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