Arbeitspapier

Unemployment Benefits and Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation

This paper explores the rationale for unemployment benefits as a complement to optimal non-linear income taxation. High-skilled workers and low-skilled workers face different exogenous risks of being unemployed. As long as the low-skilled workers face a higher unemployment risk, we find that there is a case for over-insuring the low-skilled, hence the unemployment benefits of the low-skilled should be higher than the pure insurance purpose would prescribe. This effect is likely to prevail in a model with a more realistic treatment of the labor market.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2003:3

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Labor Contracts
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Thema
Optimal non-linear income taxation
unemployment benefits
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Engström, Per
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Uppsala
(wann)
2003

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-4455
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Engström, Per
  • Uppsala University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2003

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