Arbeitspapier
Unemployment Benefits and Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation
This paper explores the rationale for unemployment benefits as a complement to optimal non-linear income taxation. High-skilled workers and low-skilled workers face different exogenous risks of being unemployed. As long as the low-skilled workers face a higher unemployment risk, we find that there is a case for over-insuring the low-skilled, hence the unemployment benefits of the low-skilled should be higher than the pure insurance purpose would prescribe. This effect is likely to prevail in a model with a more realistic treatment of the labor market.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2003:3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Labor Contracts
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Thema
-
Optimal non-linear income taxation
unemployment benefits
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Einkommensteuer
Optimale Besteuerung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Engström, Per
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Uppsala
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-4455
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Engström, Per
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2003