Arbeitspapier
Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation for Reduction of Envy
This paper examines the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem based on Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson's (1990) λ-equitability in a two-class economy. An allocation is λ-equitable if no agent envies a proportion λ of the bundle of any other agent. We examine the properties of Pareto undominated allocations for various λ-equitability requirements. When there is one output, the marginal income tax rate can increase only if (but not if) leisure is a luxury. In a multi-commodity model with commodity taxes, the goods preferred by the low skilled agent and/or of high Hicksian elasticities are taxed more heavily.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 991
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Subject
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Income Taxation
Envy
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Nishimura, Yukihiro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
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2000
- Handle
- Last update
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20.09.2024, 8:23 AM CEST
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nishimura, Yukihiro
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2000