Artikel
An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, and that the monitoring is sufficiently connected. In all repeated game equilibria, each period play is an equilibrium of the stage game. When the monitoring is approximately connected, and equilibrium strategies have a uniformly bounded past, then each period play is an approximate equilibrium of the stage game.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 25-55 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
Repeated games
anti-folk theorem
private monitoring
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Peski, Marcin
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
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2012
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE760
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Peski, Marcin
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2012
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