Artikel
Delegating performance evaluation
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap. Our analysis has implications for various applications, such as the design of worker compensation or the allocation of research grants.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 15 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 477-509 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Subjective performance evaluation
mechanism design without money
optimal delegation
optimality of contests
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Letina, Igor
Liu, Shuo
Netzer, Nick
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2020
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE3570
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Letina, Igor
- Liu, Shuo
- Netzer, Nick
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2020
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