Arbeitspapier
On linear transformations of intersections
For any linear transformation and two convex closed sets, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when the transformation of the intersection of the sets coincides with the intersection of their images. We also identify analogous conditions for non-convex sets, general transformations, and multiple sets. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results via an application to the economics literature of mechanism design.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 255
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Linear transformation
convex closed set
intersection
directional convexity
mechanism design
dominant-strategy implementation
Bayesian implementation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kushnir, Alexey
Liu, Shuo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-137636
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kushnir, Alexey
- Liu, Shuo
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Voting with public information
Voting with public information
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: The case of non-linear utilities
Monotone equilibria in signalling games
Happy times: Identification from ordered response data
Targeted information and limited attention
Happy times: Identification from ordered response data
Designing organizations in volatile markets
Targeted information and limited attention
Happy Times: Measuring Happiness Using Response Times
Happy times: Measuring happiness using response times
Startup acquisitions: Acquihires and talent hoarding
Voting with public information
Voting with public information
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: The case of non-linear utilities
Monotone equilibria in signalling games
Happy times: Identification from ordered response data
Targeted information and limited attention
Happy times: Identification from ordered response data
Designing organizations in volatile markets
Targeted information and limited attention
Happy Times: Measuring Happiness Using Response Times
Happy times: Measuring happiness using response times
Startup acquisitions: Acquihires and talent hoarding
Voting with public information
Voting with public information
On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation: The case of non-linear utilities
Monotone equilibria in signalling games
Happy times: Identification from ordered response data
Targeted information and limited attention
Happy times: Identification from ordered response data
Designing organizations in volatile markets
Targeted information and limited attention
Happy Times: Measuring Happiness Using Response Times
Happy times: Measuring happiness using response times