Arbeitspapier
Delegating performance evaluation
We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of the bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap, and it can also be implemented by a nested Tullock contest. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 266
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
Performance evaluation
delegation
optimality of contests
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Letina, Igor
Liu, Shuo
Netzer, Nick
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-141281
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Letina, Igor
- Liu, Shuo
- Netzer, Nick
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
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