Arbeitspapier
Targeted information and limited attention
We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 230
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Advertising
- Thema
-
Targeted Advertising
Limited Attention
Ad Avoidance
Salience
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hefti, Andreas
Liu, Shuo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-124916
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hefti, Andreas
- Liu, Shuo
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2019