Arbeitspapier
Targeted information and limited attention
We examine the implications of limited consumer attention for the targeting decisions of competing firms. Limited attention alters the strategic role of information provision as firms may become incentivized to behave as mass advertisers, despite perfect targeting abilities. We analyze the consequences of limited attention for targeting, strategic pricing, market shares, attention competition between firms, and the value of marketing data to firms. Accounting for limited attention in an otherwise standard targeting framework can explain several recent key issues from the advertising industry, such as consumer-side information overload or the increased usage of ad blocking tools.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 230
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Advertising
- Subject
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Targeted Advertising
Limited Attention
Ad Avoidance
Salience
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hefti, Andreas
Liu, Shuo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Zurich
- (when)
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2019
- DOI
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doi:10.5167/uzh-124916
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hefti, Andreas
- Liu, Shuo
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2019