Arbeitspapier

Vickerey allocation rule with income effect

We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private companies with highest abilities to utilize the licenses. Usually companies with higher abilities can make more profits by licenses and are willing to pay higher prices for them. Thus, auction mechanisms are often employed to extract the information on companies' abilities and to allocate licenses efficiently. However, if prices are too high, they may damage companies' abilities to operate. Generally high prices may change the benefits agents obtain from the goods unless agents' preferences are quasi-linear, and we call it 'income effect'. In this paper, we establish that on domains including nonquasi-linear preferences, that is, preferences exhibiting income effect, an allocation rule which satisfies Pareto-efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and nonnegative payment uniquely exists and it is the Vickrey allocation rule.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 646

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Vickrey auction
allocation rule
income effect
strategy-proofness
Auktionstheorie
Allokation
Einkommenseffekt
Verhandlungstheorie
Neue politische Ökonomie
Strategie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Saitoh, Hiroki
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Saitoh, Hiroki
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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