Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains "almost all" preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2015:18

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Auctions ; Rationing; Licensing
• Subject: Rationing Price Equilibrium ; (Extended) English Price Sequences ; Iterative English Auction Rule

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Andersson, Tommy ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260156
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET