Arbeitspapier

A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems

We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the Vickrey rule in terms of the three properties in Holmström (1979) cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on the quasi-linear single-peaked domain, the Vickrey rule is still the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1120

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Auctions
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
Slot allocation problem
single-peakedness
efficiency
strategy-proofness
individual rationality
Vickrey rule

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Zhou, Yu
Chun, Youngsub
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Zhou, Yu
  • Chun, Youngsub
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2021

Ähnliche Objekte (12)