Arbeitspapier
Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples
In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents’ utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit elegant efficiency and incentive-compatibility. These auctions are conjured to preserve their properties beyond quasi-linearity. Nevertheless, we exemplify that with general utility functions, these auctions fail to identify the MPEs and are substantially inefficient and manipulatable. The implications of our negative results for multi-object auction models with agents with multi-unit demand, and matching with contracts models are also discussed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1116
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Auctions
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
Multi-object auction
minimum price equilibrium
examples
quasi-linear utility functions
general utility functions
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Zhou, Yu
Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Zhou, Yu
- Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2021
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