Arbeitspapier

Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples

In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents’ utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit elegant efficiency and incentive-compatibility. These auctions are conjured to preserve their properties beyond quasi-linearity. Nevertheless, we exemplify that with general utility functions, these auctions fail to identify the MPEs and are substantially inefficient and manipulatable. The implications of our negative results for multi-object auction models with agents with multi-unit demand, and matching with contracts models are also discussed.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1116

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Auctions
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Subject
Multi-object auction
minimum price equilibrium
examples
quasi-linear utility functions
general utility functions

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Zhou, Yu
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Zhou, Yu
  • Serizawa, Shigehiro
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2021

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