Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Quality, reputation and the choice of organizational form
"This paper revisits the hypothesis that nonprofit organizations emerge in markets that are characterized by contractual incompleteness because they ensure consumers against opportunistic behavior. We extend the Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) framework which studies an entrepreneur's optimal choice of organizational form and service quality when quality is non-contractible into a repeated interaction setting. The main result is that when reputations can be sustained, then for-profit status is the preferred organizational form and high quality services are ensured. This finding suggests that existing explanations of nonprofit organizations that focus entirely on contractual imperfections in the producer/consumer relationship may be inadequate." [author's abstract]
- Umfang
-
Seite(n): 515-527
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Erschienen in
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2)
- Thema
-
Wirtschaft
Psychologie
angewandte Psychologie
Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Reputation
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Vlassopoulos, Michael
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Niederlande
- (wann)
-
2009
- DOI
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-287514
- Rechteinformation
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Beteiligte
- Vlassopoulos, Michael
Entstanden
- 2009